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Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Protection Induce More Bilateral Trade? 
Evidence from China’s Imports 
 
Abstract 
Most of the previous studies on the effect of IPR protection on international trade have been 
from the perspective of major industrialized nations.  However, much of the current debate on 
the effects of IPR protection involves large developing countries with high threat of imitation.  
This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the impact of the strengthening of patent  
laws in China on its bilateral trade flows.  We estimate the effects of patent rights protection 
on China’s imports at the aggregate and detailed product categories for both OECD 
(developed) and non-OECD (developing) countries.  The empirical results suggest that 
increased patent rights protection stimulate China’s imports, particularly in the knowledge-
intensive product categories. Furthermore, while the evidence in support of the market 
expansion effect is significant for imports from OECD countries, it is rather weak and mostly 
insignificant for imports from non-OECD countries.  
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1.  Introduction 
In the past two decades, the nature of the linkages between intellectual property rights 
(IPR) and international trade has been the source of much debate and controversy.   
Disagreements persist on whether stronger IPR stimulate or discourage trade.  Two key 
developments contributed to the recent interest in this issue.  In the political arena, the status 
of IPR as a form of trade barrier became an issue of greater global concern after the enactment 
of a special provision in the US Trade Act of 1988 which linked American trade policy to the 
prevailing IPR regimes in bilateral trading partner nations.  In addition, IPR became even 
more important when increasing national disputes over IPR led to the multilateral World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) in 1994.   Since trade in knowledge-based goods is an important source of 
innovation and technology for low-income countries, it is not surprising that one of the main 
issues surrounding the IPR debate was centered on the need for greater IPR protection in 
developing countries.  But despite the importance of IPR laws to developing countries, 
relatively limited empirical evidence exist on the impact of IPR regimes on bilateral trade 
flows with developing nations (Schneider, 2005).   
This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the impact of the strengthening of 
patent laws in China on its bilateral trade flows.  China’s recent reform of its patent laws and 
its status as a large developing nation with strong threat of imitation makes it an interesting 
case study on the effect of patent protection on trade.  As in previous studies, we also explore 
the possibility that the trade effect of patent protection may vary by product sectors and by the 
level of economic development in trading partner countries (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; 
Smith, 1999).  Since industrialized countries, i.e., major OECD countries, are the main 4 
 
producers of new technology, we expect that the strengthening of patent protection in China 
will have a stronger effect on bilateral trade (import) flows to China from OECD countries 
relative to import flows from non-OECD countries.  The results from this study provide much 
needed empirical evidence on the current debate regarding policy reforms in IPR regimes and 
its effects on technology transfer and trade with China.   
This paper differs from previous studies in several ways.  First, this is the first 
empirical study based on one developing country which experienced significant changes in its 
IPR systems (including its patent laws) in the past two decades. Thus, this analysis from the 
perspective of a large developing country provides an alternative to most previous studies 
which usually emphasize export flows from a major industrialized nation to a diverse group of 
importers (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Smith, 1999; Rafiquzzaman, 2002). Second, in 
contrast to studies based on data from a single year, this study uses a panel data (1991-2004) 
which covers a more extended time period and allows for the consideration of the dynamic 
nature of the relationship between international trade and policy changes in patent regimes.  
Third, we use an alternative measure of patent rights that may be more reflective of 
actual patent activities.  Previous studies typically use patent rights indices or scores based on 
the works of Rapp and Rozek (1990) and Ginarte and Park (1998). These indices usually use a 
scoring method that is often arbitrary in the choice of weights on the importance of various 
criteria. Although useful in some cases, the index-based measures of patent rights may not 
adequately capture the dynamic nature of the interaction between changes in patent laws and 
standards over time and their potential impact on other economic variables (e.g., trade).   
When possible, it may be more instructive to use actual data on the number of patent 
applications over time as adopted in this study.  Thus, we use annual patent applications from 5 
 
importing countries as a measure of the strength of patent rights protection in China. The 
growing number of foreign patents filed each year can be a good indicator of growing 
confidence of foreign firms in the patent rights protection offered in China. This measure of 
patent rights strength accounts for more variation across time and may be less susceptible to 
measurement errors.  
The main finding from this study is that the strengthening of patent laws in China led 
to an increase in its import flows, particularly in knowledge-intensive goods. This paper’s 
empirical results further support the hypothesis that the strengthening of patent laws has a 
market expansion effect in China.  However, we also find that market expansion effect is only 
strong and significant for imports flows from major OECD countries, though the effect seems 
to be declining over the years.  In contrast, the evidence for market expansion effect is much 
weaker for imports from non-OECD countries.  Also, the results suggest that the effects of 
patent rights protection on import flows vary by different product sectors and are strongest in 
the knowledge-intensive sectors. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains a brief review of 
literature on the trade effects of IPR. Section 3 describes the model specifications and data 
sources. Section 4 provides a discussion of results and section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Patent rights protection and international trade: A Puzzle 
2.1 What does theory predict? 
Although the theoretical linkage between patent rights and innovation has received much 
attention, relatively fewer theoretical studies exist on the relationship between patent rights 
and international trade (Chin and Grossman, 1988; Helpman, 1993; Ethier and Markusen, 6 
 
1996; Maskus and Penumbarti, 1997; Markusen, 2001; Qian, 2007). The existing theory 
suggest that the strengthening of patent rights protection could have two opposing effects on 
bilateral trade flows between countries: market expansion or market power effects (Maskus 
and Penubarti, 1995).   
A market expansion effect may occur if the strengthening of patent protection discourages 
domestic firms from imitating the technologies embodied in imported goods. The resulting 
reduction in the production of competing domestically produced imitation goods should 
encourage foreign firms with better technologies to expand their exports to those markets as a 
result of increased net demand for their products.  In contrast, a market power effect may 
occur if foreign firms respond to stronger patent laws in an importing nation by choosing to 
reduce their foreign market sales in that market and take advantage of higher unit price. The 
countervailing nature of the market expansion and market power effects implies that the 
direction of the impact of patent rights strengthening on trade is ambiguous (Maskus and 
Penumbarti, 1995; Smith, 1999).  This ambiguity could be attributed to the complex 
interactions between local market demand, the degree of imitative production, and the nature 
of trade barriers (Maskus, 2000, p.113).  Thus, the debate is on-going regarding the nature of 
the relationship between IPR and international trade.  Since this is an empirical question, most 
of the previous investigations have been data-driven.  
 
2.2 Review of previous empirical studies 
In a seminal study, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) used an augmented version of the 
Helpman-Krugman model of monopolistic competition to estimate the effect of patent 
protection on international trade flows.  Their results, based on 1984 bilateral trade data, show 7 
 
that the market expansion effect dominate the market power effect as they found that higher 
levels of patent protection have a positive impact on manufacturing exports of OECD nations 
to developing countries.  Subsequent studies provide some qualifications on the evidence in 
support of market expansion effect.  Smith (1999) further extends this line of inquiry by 
exploring the effect of the threat of imitation in the importing countries. The threat of 
imitation is weakest in countries with weak imitative abilities and strong patent laws and is 
strongest in countries with strong imitative abilities and weak patent laws.  The market 
expansion effect is expected to be more pronounced in the market with high threat of 
imitation, while the market power effect should be more likely in importing countries with 
low threat of imitation.  Using US manufacturing exports data, Smith (1999) showed that the 
link between patent rights protection and international trade depends on the ability of the 
importer to imitate the exporter’s technology.  She found empirical evidence supporting the 
market expansion effect for US manufacturing exports to countries with high imitation threat, 
but found the market power effect to be more prevalent for exports to countries with weak 
threat of imitation.   
In a recent study based on Canadian exports data, Rafiquzzaman (2002) found similar 
results indicating that stronger patent laws induced more Canadian exports to countries with 
strong threat of imitation and less exports to those markets with weak threat of imitation.  In 
addition, Fink and Braga (1999) examined the IPR and trade nexus using 1992 data for a 
cross-section of 89 countries and found that stronger patent rights increase bilateral flows of 
manufactured non-fuel imports.  They noted that the positive link is weaker for trade in the 
high-technology sectors.  Other studies on the relationship between patent rights and trade 8 
 
flows to developing countries draw similar conclusions (Lesser, 2001; Park and Lippoldt, 
2003).  
 
2.3  Patent rights protection in China 
Among developing countries, China is particularly suitable as a case study for 
analyzing the impact of IPR reforms on bilateral trade flows.  Although China is one of the 
largest economies in the world and operates a significant trade surplus with most other nations, 
it is a net importer of capital-intensive manufacturing products.  For example, about 80% of 
China’s imports are used as intermediate inputs in its growing manufacturing sectors 
(Tongzon, 2001).  Surprisingly, China had no patent rights protection before 1985. However, 
since the establishment of its first patent law in 1985 and its substantial revision in 1992, 
China has undergone a gradual reform of its patent systems in order to achieve compliance 
with international laws.  Although the 1985 version of China’s patent law contained its most 
comprehensive requirements hitherto, it still lacked several important components.  
 In 1992, mainly due to the pressure from the United States, China’s patent law was 
substantially amended to bring it closer to those of many industrial nations (Allison and Lin, 
1999).  The strengthening of China’s patent laws was also accelerated by its membership in 
several IPR-related international treaties, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) in 1995.  Most recently, the latest revision of China’s patent law was made in 2000 as 
part of the preparations for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).   
Furthermore, as a recent member of the WTO, China has also made significant efforts toward 
aligning its IPR laws (i.e. patents, copyrights and trademarks) with the requirements of the 
TRIPS agreement and other major international IPR conventions  (Maskus, 2004, 2006). 9 
 
Since 1992, foreign patents have increased steadily with an annual growth rate of 19% (see 
Figure 1).
1 The majority of Chinese patents (invention patent applications) are filed by foreign 
firms and the most important foreign patentees are from Japan, the US, EU countries, and 
South Korea.  
 
3.  Econometric methods  
3.1 Model Specification and Hypotheses 
We apply a conventional gravity model of bilateral trade to estimate the effects of 
China’s patent rights protection on its import flows. The gravity model has a long history in 
theoretical and empirical studies of international trade (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1989, 
1990).  Typically, it estimates bilateral trade flows as a function of exporter and importer 
characteristics and various determinants of trade, including factors that distort trades (e.g., 





ηεijt,     (1)  
where i, j, and t are indexes for the source country, the destination country and year, 
respectively.  IMPORTijt denotes the imports of the source country to the destination country 
(China).  Gross domestic product (GDP) is employed as a proxy for national income or 
market size.  GDPit and GDPjt denote the GDP of the source and destination countries, 
respectively.  The variable DISTij measures the distance between the source and the 
destination countries. Aijt represents trade distortion factors, and εijt is a normally distributed 
error term with zero mean and constant variance.  
                                            
1 The figure is computed by the authors, based on the patent data collected directly from Chinese patent database 
CNPAT ABSDAT (http://www.sipo.gov.cn). 10 
 
Equation (1) could be augmented with the inclusion of Chinese tariff rate (TARIFFijt) 
and a measure of patent rights protection in China (PATENTijt).  After taking the natural logs, 
the resulting model is expressed as: 
Log (IMPORTijt) = α +  1 β Log (GDPit) +  2 β Log (GDPjt) +  3 β Log (DISTijt) + 
4 β Log (1+TARIFFijt)
 +  5 β Log (PATENTijt) + εijt     (2) 
where  1 β  and  2 β represent the income elasticities of import demand and the expected sign is 
positive.  3 β  is expected to have a negative sign as distance is a proxy for transportation cost 
which should vary inversely with imports. for 4 β is the import tariff coefficient and the 
expected sign is negative indicating that higher tariff rate should discourage imports.  As 
discussed previously, the existing theory suggests that the sign of the coefficient on the 
patents variable, 5 β  is ambiguous.  A positive sign on this parameter estimate will provide 
support for the market expansion effect while a negative sign will suggest support for the 
market power effect.  Nevertheless, since China is commonly perceived as a large country 
with strong threat of imitation, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the market expansion effect 
will dominate such that stronger patent protection will result in more imports into China .  
 
3.2 Model estimation and data issues 
Hsiao (2003) argues that OLS estimates of equation (2) may yield biased estimates if 
certain specification issues are not adequately addressed. First, for a large and diverse cross-
section of countries as in this study, OLS is subject to unobservable heterogeneity bias. A 
common remedy is the specification of a model that includes country-specific effects in the 
panel regressions.  Hausman (1978) specification test result suggests that the random effects 11 
 
model is more appropriate than the fixed effects model.  The random effects estimator, which 
accounts for the unobserved country-specific effects, requires the transformation of equation 
(2) so that each variable for each country is normalized such that the time-invariant country-
specific effects are removed.  The mean of unobserved and specific country effects is 
reflected in the single constant term.   
Furthermore, for a cross-section of countries of various sizes as in this study and given 
the notable growth in China’s bilateral trade, it is plausible to expect the presence of 
heteroskedastic errors.  Likelihood ratio test for heteroskedasticity was applied and the null 
hypothesis of homoskedastic errors was easily rejected at the 5 percent significance level 
suggesting the presence of heteroskedasticity (Green, 2000).  Hence, the parameter estimates 
reported in the tables are based on robust standard errors from Huber-White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. 
In addition, there is the potential for simultaneity bias because the causal link between 
imports and some of the regressors may be bi-directional.  For example, while import growth 
may affect GDP, the reverse is also possible. Furthermore, countries with higher per capita 
income tend to export more on average and have higher likelihood of producing patented 
knowledge-intensive products. If endogeneity problem exists, then an instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation method is more appropriate. Results from the Hausman test for the 
disaggregate product level data indicate that the null hypothesis of no simultaneity bias could 
not be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.  Thus, in order to account for cross-
sectional heterogeneity, a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation technique was 
applied to the data (Baltagi 2001, p. 79-80).     12 
 
The analysis involves the estimation of equation (2) for both aggregated import and 
for twenty manufacturing product sectors, using a panel data set covering 1991-2004.  In 
order to remove short-term cyclic fluctuations of patent filings, three-year averages were 
used.
2 The sample consists of 36 countries which include 21 OECD countries and 15 non-
OECD countries.  These are the top trading partners of China with significant number of 
patent applications over the estimation period.  The summary statistics of variables used in 
this study are provided in Table 1.   
Gross domestic product (GDP) of both source countries and China are taken from 
World Development Indicators 2006.  Trade data (IMPORTijt) for the twenty product sectors 
are organized according to the 2-digit classification of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) and were obtained from the United Nations Comtrade database.
3   These 
sectors can be further grouped into knowledge-intensive products (mainly outputs from 
science-based industrial sectors) and non-knowledge-intensive products (mainly outputs from 
traditional or low-tech industrial sectors).  All import values are deflated to 2000 constant US 
dollar using China’s CPI index. As in previous studies, the tariff rate (TARIFFijt) is measured 
as the ratio of total import duties to the total value of imports (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; 
Fink and Braga, 1999; Rafiquzzaman, 2002).  The data on tariff duties were obtained from 
various issues of China Statistical Yearbook.  The distance variable is measured as the 
distance in miles between capital cities of importing countries and China 
(http://www.indo.com/distance). 
 
                                            
2 The data used the following averages: 1991-1993, 1994-1996, 1997-1999, 2000-2002, and 2003-2004.  Thus 
we have a total of 180 observations for model estimations.  
3 UN Comtrade database is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade. 13 
 
3.3 Measurement of patent rights protection 
In several previous studies, the strength of patent rights protection was measured using 
IPR indexes constructed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) and Ginarte and Park (1997).  These 
popular IPR rankings are usually based on five components: (1) the extent of patent rights 
coverage, (2) membership in international treaties, (3) enforcement mechanisms, (4) duration 
of protection, and (5) provisions against loss of protection.  While this approach for 
measuring IPR strength has its merits, it also has some limitations.  For example, the indexes 
are based on laws on the books and may not accurately reflect dynamic changes in actual 
patent protection practices in these countries.  The criteria used in constructing the indexes 
could be quite subjective with potential for large measurement errors and may not adequately 
reflect the effect of diversity in levels of economic development (Fink and Braga, 1999).   
In contrast to other studies, we measure the strength of patent protection as the actual 
number of patent applications (PATENTijt) from importing countries.  We assume that the 
steady and growing number of patent applications from industrialized countries in the last 
decade closely reflects the growing confidence of foreign firms in the improvements in 
China’s patent rights protection.  Thus, we employ patent applications from importing 
countries as a proxy for the strength of patent rights in China.  Relative to the available IPR 
scores, this measure of patent protection provides more variations and less measurement 
errors from more subjective considerations in constructing IPR indexes.  The data for patent 
applications were obtained directly from official Chinese patent database.  This database is 
maintained by the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China (http://www.sipo.gov.cn).   
 14 
 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1. All Countries Combined 
Table 2 presents the empirical results for the estimated random effects model from 
equation (2) using data for all countries combined.  The first row reports parameter estimates 
for aggregate imports while subsequent rows contain estimates for disaggregated 2-digit SITC 
product categories.  In general, the coefficients on the control variables (incomes for exporters 
and China, tariff, and distance) have the expected signs and are significant at the 10 percent 
level.  The remainder of the discussion of results will focus on the effect of the patent variable 
on imports.  At the aggregate product level, the effect of foreign patents on imports has the 
expected positive but is statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level (see Table 1, first row).  
It is possible that the high level of data aggregation (product categories and level of 
development differences across countries) is hiding much of the impact of patents on imports.  
It may be more interesting to examine the effect of patents at a less aggregated product level.   
At the disaggregated product sector level, the impact of patents appears to be 
relatively stronger.  The results (shown in Table 2) indicate that strengthened patent rights 
protection have a positive and significant effect on imports in seven product categories and 
negative and significant effect for one sector (beverages and tobacco).  This finding implies 
strong support for the market expansion hypothesis.  Furthermore, the market expansion 
effect tend to be stronger and larger on average in knowledge-intensive sectors (i.e., 
electronics, instruments, machinery, pharmaceuticals, rubbers and transports) where the 
manufacturing process usually involves significant investment in research and development.  
The impact of patents on pharmaceuticals (where the patent coefficient equals 1.07) is the 
largest among the sectors.  Since the majority of patents are filed by knowledge-intensive 15 
 
product sectors, it is not surprising to find that the impact of patents is relatively larger in 
these sectors.  The results at the sector level are supportive of the theory that the market 
expansion effect is predominant in a large market with high threat of imitation (Smith, 1999).  
A notable exception to the finding of market expansion effect is in the beverages and 
tobacco sector where the patent coefficient value is -0.716.  This sector’s negative and 
statistically significant estimate provides some evidence in support of the market power effect. 
This finding is consistent with Smith (1999) who also found evidence for market power effect 
of increased patent protection in the US exports of tobacco products.   
 
4.2  OECD countries versus non-OECD countries 
Next, we consider the possibility that the impact of patent protection on imports may 
vary by the level of economic development.  OECD countries are the major sources of 
advance technologies and consequently majority of foreign patents in China are filed by those 
countries.  In contrast to imports from non-OECD nations, technologies embodied in imports 
from OECD countries are on average more patent-related. Most developing (or non-OECD ) 
countries still lack sufficient innovation ability to develop high level technologies which are 
worth patenting.  Thus, we expect the effect of patent rights protection on imports to be more 
pronounced across all sectors for OECD countries, but should be relatively weaker and less 
significant for non-OECD nations.  Using the World Bank Development Indicators 
classification scheme, the countries in our sample were divided into two groups: high-income 
OECD (developed) and low-income non-OECD (developing) countries.
4    
                                            
4 The OECD countries used in the analysis includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, USA. 16 
 
Table 3 contains the results from the estimation of equation (2) for high-income 
OECD (developed) countries only.  In general, the evidence indicate that patent  protection 
have a positive impact on China’s imports, further confirming the support for a market 
expansion effect. At the aggregated product level, the model fits improved significantly from 
the combined countries results in Table 2.  The patent coefficient (0.343) is positive and 
statistically significant.  Similarly at the disaggregated product sector level, the estimated 
patent coefficients are positive and significant for nine sectors and negative and significant for 
one sector (i.e., beverages and tobacco).  The market expansion effect is more pronounced in 
knowledge-intensive sectors: nine of the knowledge-intensive sectors are significant.  For 
knowledge-intensive sectors, the estimated patent coefficients range from 0.574 in plastics to 
0.926 in instruments. These results show again that the effects of patents on imports vary not 
only between knowledge-intensive sectors and non-knowledge-intensive sectors but also 
within these two categories.  Similar to previous results, the beverages and tobacco sector has 
a negative and statistically significant estimated  patent coefficient value of -1.310, suggesting 
evidence for market power effect of increased patent rights protection in this secto.   
The variations in the effects of patents across product sectors can be attributed to 
various reasons.  For instance, the propensity to obtain patents for a product varies across 
different industrial sectors, due to different technology opportunities, and market conditions.  
In some industries firms have alternative means to appropriate the returns to their investment, 
such as lead-time advantages or brand name reputation, or their technologies may be difficult 
                                                                                                                                        
The non-OECD countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico , the Phillipines, 





to imitate or reverse engineer.  In this case, firms may not seek IPR protection but rather rely 
on natural protection of their innovations.  Furthermore, within the knowledge-intensive 
sectors, patent protection are generally considered to be very important for those industries 
where their technologies are relatively easy to imitate, such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and 
computer industries In contrast, patent protection are viewed to be of moderate importance in 
other industries (e.g., metals, machinery and transports) where the technologies are relatively 
more difficult to imitate (Park and Lippoldt, 2003).   
  Table 4 presents the empirical results for non-OECD (developing) countries.  This 
group of countries includes the most important emerging economies, such as India, Brazil, 
South Africa and Southeast Asian countries.  As expected, the effect of patents on trade is 
significantly weaker for these non-OECD countries.  For example, at the aggregate product 
level, the estimated patent coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  In 
sharp contrast to the results for OECD countries (see Table 3), only two disaggregated 
product categories have statistically significant patent coefficients:  pharmaceuticals (1.09) 
and wood products (-1.20).  In the former case, a comparison of the estimated patent 
coefficients across OECD and non-OECD countries suggest that while 1% increase in total 
patent filings leads to a 1. 09% increase in pharmaceutical imports from non-OECD 
(developing) countries; it only led to 0.532% increase in imports from OECD (developed) 
countries.  
This finding confirms earlier conclusions in previous studies which suggest that firms 
in rich industrial nations may respond to increase in patent protection by significantly 
increasing their level of FDI or licensing as an alternative mode of entry instead of just 
increasing international trade.  As discussed in Smith (2001), there might be simultaneous 18 
 
effects of patents on imports, FDI and /or licensing for developed countries.  Hence, the 
patent coefficients tend to be smaller as some of the market expansion effect is offset by FDI 
or licensing.
5  In contrast, when the effect is significant, large developing countries appear to 
increase trade volumes to a country with stronger patent protection.  
 
4.3  The dynamic effect of patents on trade  
The results discussed above reflect the average effects of patents on import flows into 
China over the years 1991-2004.  However, there were significant reforms in patent laws 
during these years.  In order to better understand how the effects of patents on imports varied, 
this section analyzes the data by patent regimes that coincide with major patent policy reforms 
in China.  To properly identify the different patent regimes in China, we use five elements 
used in computing IPR scores (Ginarte and Park, 1997) as a reference.  Beginning with 
China’s first patent law in 1985, China’s patent policy could be classified into three different 
patent regimes: (1) substantial revision of patent law in 1992 (this includes the extension of 
coverage to pharmaceuticals and chemicals; and the explicit specification of standard duration 
of protection); (2) joining the WIPO in 1995 (most important membership in international 
agreements); and (3) WTO accession in 2001(conformity with TRIPs agreements).   
Based on these points of major patent policy changes, the data was divided into three 
sub-periods as follows: pre-WIPO period (1991-1995), pre-WTO period (1996-2000), and 
post-WTO period (2000-2004).  In our view, the most important period is the pre-WIPO 
period as China’ s patent laws were considered to be comparable to the world standard only 
                                            
5 According to World Investment Report 2005 (UNCTAD, 2005), multinational firms in developing countries are 
less transnationalized than their counterparts in the developed countries. Our results here seem to support this 
view.  However, due to the constraint of data, further analysis of the effect of patents on FDI can not be carried 
out at the this point.  19 
 
after 1992.  To assess how the trade effects change over different patent regimes, we estimate 
equation (2) for the three sub-periods separately, both for the OECD and non-OECD countries. 
Table 5 contains the results from the estimation of equation (2) using pooled annual 
data for each of the three sub-periods reported separately for both OECD (developed) and 
non-OECD (developing) countries.
6  For developed countries, there is a clear pattern showing 
that patents  have a very significant effect on China’s imports in the pre-WIPO period (1991-
1995) when the initial wave of patent laws were established.  However, in subsequent years, 
the effect of patents on imports notably declined.  During the first period of 1991-1995, the 
patent coefficients are not only more significant but also larger.  For example, 16 out of 20 
product categories have statistically significant patent coefficients with values close to or 
larger than 1.  This indicates that the market expansion effect was very strong during the 
earlier years when China began to strengthen its patent laws.  The weakening of the effect of 
patents on imports from developed nations could be explained by the increasing role of FDI in 
China in recent years.  China’s further revision of its patent laws to conform with the TRIPs 
agreement sent a signal to foreign firms of its willingness to further strengthen and enforce its 
patent laws.  Previous studies have shown that foreign firms tend to respond to stronger patent 
rights by shifting from exporting commodities to establishing foreign affiliates and increasing 
licensing and FDI sales (Park and Lippoldt, 2003).  This is especially true in the case of China, 
a large developing nation with high threat of imitation.  
In contrast, for non-OECD (developing) countries, patents have a weak effect on 
imports across the three IPR regimes.  At the aggregated level, while patents have a 
significant effect on imports during the first time period, the estimates became much smaller 
                                            
6 For brevity, only the estimates of patent elasticity of imports are reported. 20 
 
and statistically insignificant in subsequent sub-periods.  At the sectoral level, the results are 
mixed.  In most sectors, the effects of patents on imports are not significant over the three 
periods.  Relative to the results for China’s imports from OECD countries, increased patent 
protection have a significant effect in much fewer sectors and no consistent pattern exists for 
these non-OECD countries.  It is only in the case of food imports where patents have a 
significant effect in all three sub-periods.   
In recent years, several large developing countries have benefited from globalization 
and the accompanying internationalization of knowledge generation via offshore research and 
development (R&D) by multinational corporations in developing countries (e.g., India, 
Thailand, and Malaysia).  The internationalization of R&D not only facilitates the transfer of 
technology to the host countries, but could also generate spillovers which may stimulate 
domestic innovation in host countries.  Although past studies have shown that spillovers from 
developed countries to developing countries are substantial (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997; Keller 2002), empirical evidence is still sparse.  The results 
from current analysis suggest that China’s imports from developing countries are not 
significantly patent-related.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
Although several studies have investigated the effect of IPR protection on international 
trade from the perspective of major industrialized nations, to our knowledge, no previous 
analysis have examined this issue from the perspective of a developing nation with strong 
threat of imitation.  In this study, we examine the impact of patent rights protection on 
China’s aggregate and sectoral imports.  Specifically, the analysis provides empirical 21 
 
evidence for addressing these three questions of interests: (1) to what extent do the effects of 
patent protection vary across various manufacturing product sectors? (2) does the impact of 
patent  protection differ between OECD (developed) and non-OECD (developing) countries? 
(3) to what extent does the impact of patents  vary across time as the strength of China’s IPR 
protection increased?  This analysis provides new insights on these empirical questions.   
The empirical results suggest that exporters respond positively to the strengthening of 
patent laws in China.  This finding further confirms the results from earlier studies which 
found evidence in support of the market expansion effect of stronger IPR protection in 
countries with strong threat of imitation.  In general, our results show that the market 
expansion effect is more pronounced in knowledge-intensive sectors than in non-knowledge 
intensive sectors. Although the effects of patents on imports from OECD countries are 
positive and statistically significant, the evidence for non-OECD countries is rather weak and 
insignificant in many cases.  These results are consistent with the fact that OECD countries 
are the major producers of knowledge-based outputs and are the major exporters of patent-
sensitive products.  Nevertheless, an examination of the dynamics of recent changes in patent 
regimes in the past fourteen years indicates that the impact of patent rights protection on trade 
appears to have weakened over time.  This result may be reflecting the increasing role of FDI  
by multinational corporations as the preferred alternative to international trade in commodities 
(Smith, 2001). Recent data shows that China is a leading destination of FDI from 
industrialized nations to developing and transition economies.   
Overall, this study shows that IPR reforms in China tend to attract more knowledge-
intensive imports and thus facilitates technology transfer to China.  However, it should be 
emphasized that while the implementation of stronger IPR regimes is necessary, it is not a 22 
 
sufficient condition for trade expansion and economic growth.  In addition to stronger IPR 
protection, other complementary factors such as higher levels of R&D expenditures, quality 
legal institutions, and improved physical infrastructure are also needed for narrowing the 
technology gap between China and most developed countries.  
Given the diversity in size and economic structure of developing economies, current 
empirical evidence for China should not be automatically generalized to all developing 
countries.  Nevertheless, an important policy insight from this empirical analysis is that a 
large developing nation with strong threat of imitation could reap increased bilateral trade 
benefits from harmonizing and strengthening its IPR laws to conform with international 
standards as China has done in recent years.  Future research would be beneficial in 
unraveling the complex interactions between trade, FDI, licensing and IPR protection.  As 
more industry and firm level data become available, future analyses may be able to provide 
more definitive conclusions on the trade effects of IPR protection. 
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Figure 1. Patent Filings in China from 1985-2004 
Source: Chinese patent database, CNPAT ABSDAT (http://www.sipo.gv.cn) 27 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics of main variables  
 
      In Levels        
Variables Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
IMPORTS 430652.5 904085.9 0  8994883 
(All products, in 100 millions 2000US$)         
GDPIM 7.10E+11 1.60E+12 3.64E+10  1.08E+13 
(GDP of importing countries, in 100 millions 2000 US$        
GDPC 1.02E+12 3.67E+11 4.86E+11  1.72E+12 
(GDP of China, in 100 millions 2000 US$)        
TARIFF  1.03 0.0098 1.02  1.06 
(Average tariff rate )           
DIST 5015.6  2512.4  598.0  11957.0 
(Distance between China and Importing countries)         
PATENT 894.6  2947.3  0  33187 





Table 2.  Estimation results of Gravity equations, with all the countries included 
Product Sectors GDPIM GDPC TARIFF PATENT DIST CONST R^2
(Importing) (China)
ALL PRODUCTS 0.843 *** 1.525 *** -22.556 *** 0.080 -0.832 *** -45.298 *** 0.625
(6.010) (8.870) (3.260) (1.080) (2.980) (7.300)
APPARELS 1.492 ** 3.592 *** -6.713 0.168 -3.919 *** -94.308 *** 0.663
(3.910) (5.030) (0.200) (0.960) (7.060) (4.010)
BEVERAGE,TOBACCO 2.891 *** 6.228 *** 82.253 * -0.716 ** -1.583 -223.314 *** 0.377
(4.630) (6.460) (1.830) (2.190) (1.580) (6.580)
CHEMICALS 0.940 *** 3.506 *** 10.109 0.165 -1.644 *** -91.599 *** 0.306
(3.350) (4.500) (0.290) (1.150) (3.220) (3.910)
ELECTRONICS 0.761 ** 3.957 *** 34.658 0.464 *** -2.893 *** -90.879 *** 0.475
(2.420) (5.000) (0.980) (2.720) (4.470) (3.820)
FOOD 1.066 *** 3.000 *** 12.990 -0.151 -1.002 -86.015 *** 0.184
(3.030) (3.970) (0.380) (0.860) (1.570) (3.770)
FURNITURES 0.823 * 4.602 *** 42.119 0.600 ** -2.437 *** -120.874 *** 0.525
(1.970) (6.220) (1.230) (2.570) (3.460) (4.700)
GLASS 1.265 *** 2.997 *** -9.955 0.275 -3.234 *** -75.544 *** 0.495
(3.370) (3.440) (0.220) (1.420) (4.920) (2.790)
INSTRUMENTS 0.883 *** 3.600 *** 11.341 0.580 *** -2.170 *** -91.949 *** 0.524
(2.980) (5.050) (0.370) (3.420) (3.310) (4.080)
IRONS 1.872 *** 2.969 *** -78.888 * -0.017 -2.398 *** -93.117 *** 0.420
(5.120) (3.450) (1.870) (0.100) (4.170) (3.410)
LEATHER 2.316 *** 2.518 *** -23.199 -0.293 -1.818 ** -99.206 *** 0.335
(4.130) (3.220) (0.610) (1.140) (2.180) (3.650)
MACHINERY 0.761 ** 1.828 ** -13.663 0.574 *** -1.691 ** -40.784 * 0.402
(2.610) (2.300) (0.390) (3.990) (3.050) (1.690)
METALS 0.859 ** 3.443 *** -11.412 0.142 -1.673 *** -87.731 *** 0.281
(2.890) (4.410) (0.320) (0.880) (2.790) (3.680)
PAPER PRODUCTS 1.183 ** 3.066 *** 1.265 0.083 -2.246 *** -81.814 *** 0.371
(2.590) (4.130) (0.040) (0.390) (3.000) (3.300)
PETROLUM, COAL 1.731 ** 4.560 *** -36.868 -0.076 -4.555 *** -118.767 *** 0.375
(2.780) (4.540) (0.720) (0.230) (4.970) (3.510)
PHARMACEUTICALS 0.415 1.626 * -7.186 1.070 *** -0.970 -38.864 0.458
(1.010) (1.730) (0.150) (3.750) (1.220) (1.280)
PLASTICS 1.358 *** 3.226 *** 6.268 0.024 -2.428 *** -88.624 *** 0.412
(4.470) (4.230) (0.180) (0.160) (4.480) (3.820)
RUBBER 0.810 * 3.843 *** -3.896 0.629 *** -3.251 *** -90.326 *** 0.571
(1.790) (5.460) (0.120) (2.610) (4.790) (3.480)
TEXTILES 1.309 *** 1.991 *** 3.772 0.037 -2.346 *** -54.529 ** 0.382
(4.410) (2.720) (0.110) (0.240) (4.500) (2.410)
TRANS. EQUIPMENT 1.017 ** 2.262 *** -36.446 0.626 *** -1.879 ** -59.818 ** 0.431
(2.380) (2.790) (0.990) (2.630) (2.510) (2.140)
WOOD PRODUCTS 1.124 * 3.249 *** 20.880 -0.113 -3.255 *** -79.239 ** 0.318
(1.800) (3.490) 0.500 (0.370) (3.620) (2.370)
 
*Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. t-statistics are computed based on the robust standard 
error and reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is Log (IMPORTS).  29 
 
Table 3.  Estimation results of Gravity equations, with OECD (developed) countries 
Product Sectors GDPIM GDPC  TARIFF PATENT DIST CONST R2
(Importing) (China)
ALL PRODUCTS 0.591 *** 0.691 *** -15.251 ** 0.432 *** -0.484 ** -20.927 *** 0.855
(3.850) 3.760 (2.090) (4.160) (2.550) (2.940)
APPARELS 1.189 *** 1.270 -2.676 0.488 -1.776 ** -41.567 0.615
(2.810) (1.460) (0.070) (1.020) (2.540) (1.590)
BEVERAGE,TOBACCO 4.072 *** 6.646 *** 73.904 -1.310 ** -0.782 -269.136 *** 0.500
(4.860) (5.280) (1.440) (2.140) (0.740) (5.890)
CHEMICALS 0.744 *** 2.728 *** 16.623 0.355 -0.741 ** -73.755 *** 0.328
(3.050) (3.220) (0.390) (1.260) (2.230) (3.090)
ELECTRONICS 0.454 1.904 ** 31.145 0.809 ** -0.835 ** -44.912 * 0.406
(1.490) (2.240) (0.740) (2.340) (2.410) (1.820)
FOOD 0.692 ** 2.277 *** 2.912 0.256 0.234 -68.515 *** 0.200
(1.910) (2.600) (0.070) (0.660) (0.410) (2.740)
FURNITURES 0.922 ** 2.821 *** 18.435 0.745 -0.228 -92.700 *** 0.562
(2.310) (3.500) (0.550) (1.590) (0.330) (3.820)
GLASS 1.430 *** 2.585 *** -4.667 0.036 -1.082 *** -85.266 *** 0.477
(5.650) (2.690) (0.100) (0.130) (4.840) (3.090)
INSTRUMENTS 0.374 2.092 *** -2.528 0.926 *** -0.346 -53.265 ** 0.457
(1.490) (2.700) (0.070) (3.080) (1.060) (2.410)
IRONS 1.206 *** 1.885 * -32.860 0.599 -1.618 *** -57.302 ** 0.515
(3.060) (1.970) (0.720) (1.450) (2.960) (2.000)
LEATHER 1.005 * 1.562 -11.279 0.431 -1.080 -48.353 0.307
(1.780) (1.470) (0.270) (0.740) (1.060) (1.480)
MACHINERY 0.535 * 0.798 -12.267 0.829 ** -0.344 -19.086 0.371
(1.840) (0.910) (0.280) (2.490) (0.920) (0.750)
METALS 0.631 ** 2.082 *** 5.588 0.683 ** -0.675 * -56.193 ** 0.432
(2.270) (2.600) (0.140) (2.110) (1.680) (2.430)
PAPER PRODUCTS 0.391 1.183 23.010 0.832 * -0.497 -28.247 0.354
(1.060) (1.270) (0.590) (1.730) (0.700) (1.070)
PETROLUM, COAL 1.474 ** 2.724 ** 24.455 0.500 -1.259 -94.121 ** 0.400
(2.450) (1.760) (0.390) (0.680) (1.390) (2.030)
PHARMACEUTICALS 0.508 * 1.981 ** 31.343 0.584 * 0.163 -58.466 ** 0.286
(1.620) (1.990) (0.680) (1.620) (0.440) (2.080)
PLASTICS 0.908 *** 1.793 ** 4.960 0.574 ** -1.243 *** -50.349 ** 0.502
(4.200) (2.110) (0.120) (2.110) (3.220) (2.090)
RUBBER 0.767 *** 2.332 ** 11.523 0.797 *** -0.823 * -69.109 *** 0.636
(3.240) (3.320) (0.360) (2.600) (1.860) (3.400)
TEXTILES 0.909 *** 1.233 6.642 0.541 -1.650 *** -32.002 0.475
(2.720) (1.450) (0.170) (1.510) (3.050) (1.280)
TRANS. EQUIPMENT 1.000 *** 0.627 -19.911 0.885 ** -0.217 -30.266 0.498
(2.900) (0.650) (0.480) (2.030) (0.460) (1.060)
WOOD PRODUCTS 0.755 * 0.658 19.007 0.543 -0.594 -23.343 0.402
(1.950) (0.650) (0.410) (1.330) (0.770) (0.780)  
*Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. t-statistics are computed based on the robust standard 
error and reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is Log (IMPORTS).  30 
 
Table 4.  Estimation results of Gravity equations, with non-OECD (developing) countries 
Product Sectors GDPIM GDPC TARIFF PATENT DIST CONST R^2
(Importing) (China)
ALL PRODUCTS 0.941 *** 2.181 *** -31.417 *** -0.023 -0.999 ** -63.765 *** 0.323
(2.770) (7.080) (2.840) (0.200) (2.090) (6.360)
APPARELS 1.836 *** 7.352 *** -16.798 -0.476 -6.349 *** -185.436 *** 0.745
(2.860) (5.230) (0.290) (1.490) (9.280) (4.310)
BEVERAGE,TOBACCO 1.247 7.486 *** 84.606 -0.964 -2.164 -210.674 *** 0.208
(1.040) (3.520) (0.950) (1.390) (1.180) (3.440)
CHEMICALS 1.294 * 3.999 ** 3.305 0.235 -2.587 * -106.392 ** 0.266
(1.730) (2.130) (0.050) (0.390) (1.980) (2.020)
ELECTRONICS 0.947 6.591 *** 39.569 0.220 -4.988 *** -150.734 *** 0.566
(1.100) (4.280) (0.700) (0.440) (3.740) (3.410)
FOOD 1.465 * 3.296 * 29.311 -0.239 -2.198 -94.569 * 0.230
(1.620) (1.820) (0.460) (0.400) (1.500) (1.880)
FURNITURES 0.536 7.322 *** 72.829 0.340 -4.613 *** -170.931 *** 0.555
(0.590) (4.430) (1.080) (0.700) (4.400) (3.200)
GLASS 2.322 *** 2.572 -12.722 0.843 -5.961 *** -69.319 0.667
(3.390) (1.400) (0.150) (1.490) (5.700) (1.340)
INSTRUMENTS 1.347 * 5.816 *** 29.374 0.148 -4.245 *** -147.707 *** 0.543
(1.600) (4.130) (0.570) (0.310) (3.100) (3.640)
IRONS 3.172 *** 1.976 -132.628 * 0.495 -3.116 ** -92.190 0.428
(3.990) (0.950) (1.670) (0.810) (2.510) (1.520)
LEATHER 4.056 *** 2.937 * -36.336 -0.676 -3.046 * -144.240 *** 0.433
(3.930) (1.830) (0.490) (1.240) (1.900) (2.890)
MACHINERY 0.989 2.789 -14.057 0.538 -3.034 ** -61.841 0.344
(1.260) (1.530) (0.230) (0.940) (2.380) (1.190)
METALS 0.271 4.799 ** -33.929 -0.037 -2.068 -105.531 ** 0.185
(0.320) (2.510) (0.490) (0.060) (1.380) (2.000)
PAPER PRODUCTS 1.347 5.271 *** -28.497 -0.411 -3.790 * -132.144 *** 0.464
(1.330) (3.130) (0.470) (0.760) (2.560) (2.640)
PETROLUM, COAL 2.389 ** 5.761 *** -119.305 -0.099 -7.856 *** -138.413 ** 0.506
(1.670) (3.010) (1.300) (0.160) (4.310) (2.410)
PHARMACEUTICALS 1.675 ** 1.665 -63.323 1.091 * -3.162 ** -52.877 0.416
(1.930) (0.780) (0.640) (1.790) (2.090) (0.850)
PLASTICS 1.724 ** 3.592 ** 14.961 0.284 -3.298 ** -101.400 * 0.377
(2.060) (2.010) (0.240) (0.490) (2.370) (1.950)
RUBBER 1.351 5.280 *** -23.751 0.694 -5.898 *** -121.307 ** 0.626
(1.180) (3.240) (0.370) (1.280) (5.140) (2.350)
TEXTILES 1.484 ** 1.843 4.600 0.148 -2.706 ** -51.905 0.260
(2.170) (1.090) (0.070) (0.270) (2.160) (1.050)
TRANS. EQUIPMENT 0.822 3.694 ** -56.283 0.815 -3.252 * -82.514 0.362
(0.740) (2.050) (0.850) (1.450) (1.910) (1.490)
WOOD PRODUCTS 0.230 7.955 *** 15.930 -1.200 * -5.552 *** -165.106 ** 0.403
(0.160) (3.680) (0.200) (1.700) (2.960) (2.460)  
*Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. t-statistics are computed based on the robust standard 
error and reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is Log (IMPORTS).  Table 5.  Changing effects of patents on imports:  estimated patent coefficients of 
different patent regimes 
Product Sector Subsample:OECD Countries Subsample:non-OECD Countries
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004
ALL PRODUCTS 0.886 * 0.102 0.005 0.749 ** 0.097 0.067
(1.750) (0.860) (0.070) (2.560) (1.260) (1.050)
APPARELS 0.933 * 0.377 0.162 -0.235 -0.293 0.095
(1.710) (0.970) (0.710) (0.440) (0.760) (0.440)
BEVERAGE,TOBACCO -1.051 0.078 0.334 -0.303 -1.046 ** -0.082
(1.480) (0.090) (0.600) (0.650) (2.120) (0.130)
CHEMICALS 1.901 * 0.531 -0.241 0.698 * -0.238 0.086
(1.800) (1.440) (1.350) (1.720) (0.700) (0.870)
ELECTRONICS 1.781 * 0.910 ** 0.157 0.315 0.168 0.295
(1.730) (2.150) (1.130) (0.710) (0.340) (1.210)
FOOD 1.281 0.162 -0.393 * 0.598 ** -1.023 ** -0.325 *
(1.360) (0.370) (1.800) (2.140) (2.300) (1.980)
FURNITURES 1.062 * 1.176 * -0.037 0.580 0.412 0.299
(1.650) (1.850) (0.160) (1.020) (0.640) (0.780)
GLASS 1.139 0.057 -0.241 -0.075 0.739 * 0.619 **
(1.060) (0.170) (1.350) (0.140) (1.610) (2.250)
INSTRUMENTS 1.527 * 0.968 *** 0.520 *** 0.489 0.035 0.046
(1.600) (2.690) (2.690) (1.160) (0.120) (0.180)
IRONS 1.650 ** 0.521 -0.113 0.668 -0.156 0.914 **
(2.270) (1.350) (0.970) (1.170) (0.300) (2.320)
LEATHER 1.263 * 0.085 -0.349 -0.277 0.024 -0.591
(1.640) (0.180) (0.880) (0.760) (0.040) (1.060)
MACHINERY 1.930 ** 0.085 0.070 0.210 -0.243 0.179
(2.000) (0.180) (0.510) (0.410) (0.710) (1.140)
METALS 1.444 * 0.654 * -0.109 0.306 -0.380 0.027
(1.740) (1.840) (1.280) (0.770) (0.920) (0.150)
PAPER PRODUCTS 1.036 ** 0.705 * 0.057 -0.261 -0.207 0.158
(2.100) (1.610) (0.370) (0.440) (0.590) (0.680)
PETROLUM, COAL 0.725 * -0.335 -0.058 -0.579 -1.023 ** -0.219
(1.960) (0.390) (0.160) (0.880) (2.300) (0.410)
PHARMACEUTICALS 1.399 * 0.402 0.267 0.665 0.031 1.216
(1.740) (1.020) (1.180) (1.480) (0.050) (1.550)
PLASTICS 1.409 * 0.539 * 0.142 0.218 -0.647 0.216 *
(1.670) (1.610) (1.040) (0.560) (1.590) (1.680)
RUBBER 1.415 ** 0.568 * 0.107 0.486 -0.001 -0.005
(2.510) (1.770) (0.630) (1.210) (0.000) (0.010)
TEXTILES 1.814 ** 0.163 -0.122 0.131 -0.219 0.023
(2.270) (0.440) (1.180) (0.320) (0.730) (0.180)
TRANS. EQUIPMENT 1.332 * 0.995 ** 0.498 1.057 * 0.333 0.338
(1.750) (2.420) (1.360) (1.610) (0.620) (0.880)
WOOD PRODUCTS 0.059 0.753 0.090 -0.222 -0.502 -0.255
(0.070) (1.330) (0.510) (0.570) (0.720) (0.810)
Observations 105 105 84 75 75 60
 
*Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. t-statistics are computed based on the 
robust standard error and reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is Log (IMPORTS).  Other variables are all in logs. 